Robust polarization-based quantum key distribution over collective-noise
  channel by Boileau, J. -C. et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
06
19
9v
2 
 1
5 
A
ug
 2
00
3
Robust polarization-based quantum key distribution over collective-noise channel
J.-C. Boileau1, D. Gottesman2, R. Laflamme1,2, D. Poulin1,2 and R.W. Spekkens2
1Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada.
2Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 35 King Street N., Waterloo, ON, N2J 2W9, Canada.
(Dated: October 30, 2018)
We present two polarization-based protocols for quantum key distribution. The protocols encode
key bits in noiseless subspaces or subsystems, and so can function over a quantum channel subjected
to an arbitrary degree of collective noise, as occurs, for instance, due to rotation of polarizations
in an optical fiber. These protocols can be implemented using only entangled photon-pair sources,
single-photon rotations, and single-photon detectors. Thus, our proposals offer practical and realistic
alternatives to existing schemes for quantum key distribution over optical fibers without resorting to
interferometry or two-way quantum communication, thereby circumventing, respectively, the need
for high precision timing and the threat of Trojan horse attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Pp 03.67.Dd 42.65.Lm
Quantum key distribution (QKD), such as the BB84
protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, al-
lows two parties (Alice and Bob) to generate an arbitrar-
ily long random secret key provided that they initially
share a short secret key and that they have access to a
quantum channel [1]. As opposed to classical key dis-
tribution, the secrecy of the generated key does not rely
on computational assumptions but simply on the laws of
physics: as long as quantum mechanics holds, the infor-
mation available to an eavesdropper (Eve) can be made
arbitrarily small.
Photons are obvious candidates for mediators of quan-
tum information since they are fast, cheap, and interact
weakly with the environment. Both free air and optical
fiber based QKD have been realized experimentally; see
[2] and [3] for reviews. Any experimental implementa-
tion of QKD naturally has to deal with the issue of noise
in the quantum channel, which substantially complicates
the security of QKD, as Eve may attempt to disguise her
eavesdropping as noise from another source. Standard
security proofs deal with channel noise, including photon
loss, and show that Eve acquires essentially no informa-
tion provided the noise rate is not too high. Higher noise
rates mandate lower key generation rates, and once it
becomes too large, secure key generation is impossible.
Building a viable quantum cryptographic system there-
fore depends on ensuring that the noise rate is low. The
degree of freedom used to encode the information can be
the polarization of the photon, its phase, or some com-
bination of both. Purely phase-based schemes have been
realized experimentally [4] but require complex interfero-
metric setups, high precision timing, and stable low tem-
peratures. Interferometry becomes even more challeng-
ing with multi-photon states because of the difficulty of
keeping phase coherence between the photons. A scheme
which escapes some of these limitations using a clever
encoding of key bits was proposed recently [5].
Polarization-based schemes also come with a disadvan-
tage as optical fibers rotate polarizations of transmit-
ted photons, and the degree of rotation fluctuates over
time. If left untreated, this would result in an unac-
ceptably high error rate. A number of proposals have
been made to handle this source of errors; we present
a new solution which is in some ways superior. Singlet
states |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), where {|0〉, |1〉} is any
basis of the qubit Hilbert space, have the property that
they are unchanged under equal rotations on both qubits;
this is the defining property of a noiseless subspace. (If
one’s qubits are the polarization degrees of freedom of
single photons, as we assume here, then |0〉 and |1〉 can
be taken to denote, for instance, the vertical and hor-
izontal polarization states.) We present two protocols
that take advantage of this property to encode key bits
in four- or three-photon states. These states should be
experimentally realizable, and form simple examples of a
noiseless subspace or subsystem, respectively (also called
a decoherence-free subspace and subsystem) [6, 7, 8].
Free-space QKD is largely immune to the problem of
polarization rotation: the coupling between the photons
and the molecules in the atmosphere can be absorbed in
a dielectric constant to very good approximation. The
same unfortunately cannot be said about optical fiber.
Rather, the dielectric constant acquires a spatial and
temporal dependence, yielding an overall time dependent
unitary transformation of the polarization state of a sin-
gle photon, U(t), as the net effect of the fiber. This varies
on the time-scale of thermal and mechanical fluctuations
of the fiber, the shortest of which we will refer to as τfluc.
If the time delay between the photons is small compared
to τfluc, the effect of this noise on the state of N photons
is well approximated by
ρN → [U(t)]⊗NρN [U(t)†]⊗N , (1)
where t now denotes the time of transmission. This is
known as the unitary collective noise model [6].
There are several ways to deal with collective noise.
The most obvious way is to continuously estimate the
transformation U(t) and systematically compensate for
it. However, this requires an interruption of the trans-
mission and, if the fluctuations become too rapid, the
communication channel becomes useless. A second pos-
sibility — a phase-polarization hybrid which has been
2used successfully to realize QKD over 67km [9] — uses
the Faraday orthoconjugation effect [10] to autocompen-
sate the effect of U(t). Roughly speaking, if the transfor-
mation on the photon during its transmission from Bob
to Alice is described by U(t), it can be U(t)−1 when the
photon is transmitted back from Alice to Bob, yielding
no net transformation overall. The quantum informa-
tion can be encoded by an extra phase transformation
performed by Alice before returning the photon to Bob.
Obviously, this technique only works if U(t) is roughly
constant throughout the transmission of the photon; this
sets an upper limit of cτfluc to the distance over which
QKD can be implemented with this scheme. 1
Although such two-way quantum communication can
eliminate collective noise, it allows for new attacks not
possible against BB84. Since Alice receives and emits
signals, it is possible for Eve to probe her laboratory —
a technique known as the Trojan horse attack. There
are many ways in which she can do this. She could add
a weak signal to the channel at a slightly different fre-
quency and recover some information about Alice’s phase
transformation by subsequently filtering the output sig-
nal. Eve could also try to entangle an ancilla system
with the signal before it enters Alice’s lab and perform
a joint measurement on the two after Alice has retrans-
mitted the signal. She could also intercept the signal and
send a different signal to Alice, and thereafter measure
the output to estimate the applied phase transformation,
etc. Technical solutions for some of these attacks have
been proposed. However, Eve has an enormous variety of
attacks available, and to prove true information-theoretic
security, one must assume that Eve has arbitrary techno-
logical power; for instance, she can outperform the best
frequency filtering available to Alice and Bob. Because
of its inherent use of two-way quantum communication,
the protocol is formally quite different from the standard
BB84 protocol, and proving its security may be quite
difficult.2
The schemes we propose here are purely polarization-
based and cope with collective noise without resorting to
two-way quantum communication. In the first protocol,
the quantum information is encoded in a noiseless sub-
space, while in the second protocol, it is encoded on a
noiseless subsystem.3 A noiseless subspace is invariant
under the action of the collective noise operation (here
U⊗N ). Any state within it is therefore unaffected (mod-
1 However, with today’s technology, photon loss is a much more se-
rious limitation to the distance over which QKD can be achieved.
2 Note, however, that QKD must make use of two-way classical
communication between Alice and Bob, and this presents no par-
ticular barrier to security proofs. Indeed, taking full advantage
of two-way classical communication results in a protocol with
substantially greater tolerance for noise [11].
3 Such encodings also obviate the need for Alice and Bob to share a
reference frame (such as, for instance, a known relative alignment
of their linear polarizers), as has been pointed out in the context
of quantum communication in Ref. [12].
ulo a global unphysical phase) by the noise. When such
a subspace does not exist, it may still be possible to find
a set of density operators which are invariant under the
effect of noise. These density operators instead form a
noiseless subsystem on which pure states can be encoded.
The protocols we present use singlet states as building
blocks. Information is encoded in the pairing of the pho-
tons; the various ways of organizing three or more pho-
tons into pairs provide us with different states with which
to encode information. The photons must be distinguish-
able if different pairings are to correspond to different
physical states: they need to be labelled in some way.
Physically, this means that the photons must differ with
respect to some degree of freedom. Here, the photons are
assumed to differ in their time of arrival; they are spa-
tially separated in the optical fiber. Furthermore, each
bit is encoded on multi-photon states which must also be
distinguished even in the presence of noise. Therefore,
the multiplets of photons must be spatially separated by
a distance greater than the separation between individ-
ual photons inside a multiplet. The fluctuation time τfluc
needs only to be large with respect to the difference in the
arrival times of the first and last photon of a multiplet.
It is crucial that information about the pairing resides
only in the polarization state of the photon. For exam-
ple, variations in the frequency of the photons can reveal
pairing information: the frequencies of the two photons
in each singlet must add up to the frequency of the pump,
but the frequencies of photons in different singlets need
not match. By measuring the energy of the photons, but
not their polarization, Eve can learn about how they are
paired without affecting the outcomes of Bob’s measure-
ments. This energy signature of the pairing can be elim-
inated by filtering the photons before they leave Alice’s
lab. Indeed, if the band-width of the filter is smaller than
the band-width of the pump laser, almost no information
about the pairing can be recovered by Eve. Similarly, we
must wash out the phase relation between photon pairs.
That is, the information must only be encoded on the
relative order of the photons, not in their absolute time
of arrival. This can be achieved by choosing the time
delay between the photons in each multiplet at random
from a certain range.
We will now present our two protocols: the first one
encodes the quantum information on four-photon states
while the second only requires three-photon states. We
do not prove their security here, but rather point only
to their similarities with a protocol proposed by Bennett
in 1992 (B92) [13] which is known to be secure [14]. We
hope to provide a complete security proof in a later pa-
per. The first protocol requires the definition of three
normalized states of a photon quartet:
|ψ3〉 =
|ψ2〉 =
|ψ1〉 =
= 1√
2
(|a〉 − |c〉)
= 1√
2
(|c〉 − |b〉)
= 1√
2
(|a〉 − |b〉)
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
(2)
3All these states correspond to pairs of singlet states: in
|ψ1〉, photons one and two form a singlet state and so do
photons three and four. The two other states correspond
to the two other possible ways of pairing four photons as
is illustrated by the diagrams. The states are invariant
under uniform rotations, so in any basis, these states
can be decomposed into the superpositions noted above,
where
|a〉 = 1√
2
(|0101〉+ |1010〉)
|b〉 = 1√
2
(|0110〉+ |1001〉)
|c〉 = 1√
2
(|0011〉+ |1100〉).
It is straightforward to verify that |〈ψi|ψj〉| = 1/2 for
i 6= j. It is therefore impossible to reliably distinguish
any pair of these states, but it is possible to make a mea-
surement that provides some information. Measuring the
polarization of all four photons allows Bob to distinguish
states |a〉, |b〉, and |c〉. Therefore, if Alice restricts her
transmission to one of a pair of states, Bob can tell which
of the two states she sent 50% of the time. For example,
suppose Alice transmits one of the pair {ψ1, ψ2}. When
Bob measures either “0101” or “1010”, he can conclude
that she sent |ψ1〉. When he gets either “1100” or “0011”,
he concludes she sent |ψ2〉. Given any other outcome,
Bob can not deduce with certainty which state she sent.
Note that Bob’s measurement constitutes a probabilis-
tic error-free discrimination procedure [15] for any pair of
the three states Alice might submit. That is, it is a mea-
surement that with some probability identifies, without
error, which of the pair was submitted, and with some
probability yields an inconclusive outcome.
We now present the protocol.
Protocol 1
1. Alice chooses a random (4 + δ)n bit string X and
a random (4 + δ)n trit string B.
2. Alice encodes each bit {0, 1} of X according to
{ψ1, ψ2} if the corresponding trit of B is 0; {ψ2, ψ3}
if B is 1; or {ψ3, ψ1} if B is 2.
3. Alice sends the (4+δ)n quartets of photons to Bob.
4. Bob receives the photons, and announces this fact.
For each of the (4 + δ)n photon quartets, he ran-
domly chooses between the rectilinear or diago-
nal polarization basis. He then measures each of
the four photons of each quartet according to this
choice of basis.
5. Alice announces B. Given this information, and us-
ing the procedure described above, Bob can deter-
mine, for each quartet, whether or not his measure-
ment was conclusive, and if conclusive, the value of
the encoded bit.
6. Alice and Bob discard all bits where Bob’s mea-
surement was inconclusive. With high probability,
there are at least 2n bits left which they keep. Oth-
erwise, they abort the protocol.
7. Alice selects a random subset of n bits and tells
Bob which bits were selected.
8. Alice and Bob announce and compare the value of
the n selected bits to estimate Eve’s interference;
if more than an acceptable number of errors are
found, they abort the protocol.
9. Alice and Bob perform information reconciliation
and privacy amplification on the remaining n bits.
In step 4, the choice of basis does not affect the mea-
surement outcome of Bob: this is in fact the main prop-
erty of the encoding. Nevertheless, it is crucial that Eve
does not know in which basis the measurement is per-
formed. If she knew, she could measure in the same basis
as Bob, and would know everything Bob knew. Since she
does not know, she will frequently measure in a different
basis than Bob and therefore introduce errors that will
reveal her presence.
As the protocol is written, in step 6, Alice and Bob
discard any bits for which Bob’s measurement is incon-
clusive. Nevertheless, an inconclusive result could still
be useful. Indeed, any measurement result whose weight
differs from 2, e.g. “1011”, indicates that Eve has tam-
pered with the communication. This provides Alice and
Bob with some extra data to estimate Eve’s interference:
only allowed code-words should be observed by Bob.
If steps 4 and 5 are inverted — which could only pro-
vide Eve with more information — we get a protocol
quite similar to B92. Alice encodes the bit in two pre-
selected nonorthogonal states which she sends down the
quantum channel. Bob then performs a von Neumann
measurement chosen at random from a certain set, which
can be cast in terms of a positive operator valued mea-
surement (POVM): this is also required in B92. Nev-
ertheless, there are certain differences in the nature of
these POVMs which must be studied carefully to arrive
at a complete security proof. We are currently work-
ing on these issues. The B92 protocol is not secure if the
transmission rate is below 1/2. Eve can replace the noisy
channel by a perfect channel and measure Alice’s output
in such a way that she achieves a conclusive discrimina-
tion with probability , in which case, she knows the state
and can send it to Bob. In the case of an inconclusive
result, she does not send anything. From Alice and Bob’s
point of view, this would be indistinguishable from the
natural noise. By delaying the announcement of B, our
proposal escapes this limitation.
The simplicity of the measurement — single photon
polarization — is a clear advantage of this protocol. (The
possibility of discriminating between states that are in-
variant under collective noise, without having recourse
to collective measurements, has also been noted in Ref.
[18]) Furthermore, the required states have already been
4produced by several groups [16, 17]. Two singlet states
can be produced in a short time interval via parametric
down-conversion by sending a femto-second pump laser
pulse back and forth across a crystal (using a mirror).
Since the photons are emitted in different directions, the
EPR pairs can be clearly distinguished. Zhao et al. [17]
have produced these pairs of singlets at a rate of 20 kHz.
Optical delays and switches can be used to create any of
the three states of Eq. 2. If Bob’s single-photon detec-
tors have a jitter of roughly 300 picoseconds, the delay
lines must have a length of order 10 centimeters.
At first glance, it looks like there are two copies of the
information in this encoding. For instance, if Alice an-
nounces that the bit is encoded as {ψ1, ψ2}, the value of
the first two measurement outcomes is enough to some-
times deduce the value of the encoded bit: it is neces-
sarily 1 if the outcomes are the same. The same holds
for the measurement outcomes on the last two photons.
Nevertheless, this redundancy is intrinsic to our quantum
encoding scheme and doesn’t provide Eve with any ex-
tra information. The second protocol we present exploits
this redundancy to reduce the size of the encoding.
Protocol 2 is a slight modification of Protocol 1. In
step 3, instead of sending the entire state to Bob, Al-
ice randomly discards one photon from each quartet and
sends the remaining three. In step 5, Alice should also
announce which photon she has discarded. Therefore,
the three pure states of Eq.2 are replaced by the three
mixed states
ρ3 =
ρ2 =
ρ1 =
❞ t t
t ❞ t
t t ❞
(3)
where the “◦” denotes the maximally mixed state. These
states are obviously invariant under collective noise. Fur-
thermore, any pair can be distinguished with a finite
probability, just as with the states in Protocol 1. This
follows from the fact that they constitute non-orthogonal
mixed states with non-identical supports, and the fact
that one can achieve probabilistic error-free discrimina-
tion of such mixed states [19]. For example, suppose that
Alice has announced that the bit is encoded as {ρ1, ρ2}.
Clearly, any measurement outcome of Bob’s where pho-
ton 1 and photon 2 come out parallel rules out the state
ρ1. Here, the two outcomes “000” and “111” never occur
in the absence of eavesdropping; they indicate that Eve
has tampered with the communication.
These states do not form noiseless subspaces, because
any particular pure state in the decomposition of the
density matrices ρ1, ρ2, or ρ3 does not remain invari-
ant under collective noise. Instead it is transformed into
another state in the decomposition of the same density
matrix. For instance, |Ψ−〉⊗ |0〉, in the decomposition of
ρ1, becomes under collective bit-flip |Ψ−〉⊗|1〉. The indi-
vidual states are not noiseless, but the space spanned by
them is; therefore they form a noiseless subsystem, and
the density matrices are invariant under collective noise.
This second protocol shares many similarities with
Protocol 1. It is our hope that essentially the same
proof will be able to show both protocols are secure.
In practice, Alice does not have to create two photon
pairs and discard one photon; she could simply create
one pair and one additional photon in the maximally
mixed state. This should greatly increase the optimal
transmission rate since pair creation schemes have rela-
tively low efficiency. Furthermore, Protocol 2 — based
on trios of photons instead of quartets — should suffer
less from photon loss and hence be realizable over greater
distances.
On a speculative note, perhaps the two protocols could
be hybridized into a more robust protocol. Alice could
always encode her information on photon quartets. Bob
could then divide the photon multiplets into two sets de-
pending on how many photons from the quartet actually
made it to the destination: set 1 when all four photons
made it and set 2 when only 3 photons were detected.
The outputs from set 1 could then be used to complete
Protocol 1 while those of the second set would be used as
in Protocol 2. However, this suggestion provides Eve with
a wide variety of attacks unavailable in our two protocols,
and its security must therefore be studied on a different
basis.
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